【主 题】Political Opportunism and Transaction Costs in Contractual Choice of Public–Private Partnerships: Evidence from China
【报告人】熊伟（同济大学助理教授）
【时 间】2020年11月13日（星期五）1:30 – 3:00
【地点】红瓦楼236
【主持人】杨嬛副教授
【报告摘要】
Public–private partnerships (PPP) have become a popular approach to public-sector contracting. However, in China, critics argue that PPPs waste public funding on inessential and costly projects, undermine the private sector’s efficiency, and expand long-term debt of local governments. We claim that the problems are caused by the contractual choice of Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs), in which the government bears demand risk, provides core services, and promises long-term payment. By using a PPP project database in China, we find that contractual choices are influenced by both political opportunism and transaction costs. More opportunistic bureaucrats seek to increase the adoption of PFI contracts. However, transaction costs caused by product complexities hinder governments' reliance on PFI contracts. This research contributes to the literature of public-good provision by identifying political opportunism of PPPs and applying them to contractual choice of PPPs.
【报告人简介】
熊伟，2016年博士毕业于香港科技大学土木与环境工程系，哈佛大学经济学系访问学者，现为同济大学经济与管理学院公共管理系助理教授，城市交通治理研究院兼职导师，国家发改委PPP专家。从经济学，公共管理与项目管理的跨学科视角，研究政府与市场在公共产品供给中的分工与协作，包括政府与社会资本合作（PPP），项目投融资，城市可持续发展等。在本领域的国内外高水平期刊Public Management Review, Policy & Politics, Journal of Construction Engineering & Management, Cities, Habitat International，《经济学（季刊）》等发表论文20多篇，其中1篇文章入选ESI高被引论文。申请人主持了国家自然科学基金青年项目和上海市晨光计划等科研项目。分别给本科生和研究生讲授《城市经济学》和《项目融资》课程。
【照片】
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